Michigan Law Review
Volume 63

Issue 7

1965

Federal Law Held To Govern Effect of the Release of a Joint
Tortfeasor in Private Antitrust Suit-Winchester Drive-in Theatre,

Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Co.
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, Legal Remedies
Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Federal Law Held To Govern Effect of the Release of a Joint Tortfeasor in Private
Antitrust Suit-Winchester Drive-in Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Co., 63 MICH. L. REV. 1282
(1965).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss7/9

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Federal Law Held To Govern Effect of the Release
of a Joint Tortfeasor in Private Antitrust
Suit-Winchester Drive-in Theatre, Inc.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Co.*
Private antitrust litigation occasionally raises the question of
whether state or federal law should be applied to determine the
effect of the release of a joint tortfeasor. When federal law is applied, as it was in Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Co.,1 there remains the necessity of formulating a
rule of federal law, since there appears to be no established federal
rule governing releases in antitrust suits.2
The determination of whether state or federal law is to be applied to a collateral issue arising under a federal statute depends
upon the relationship of that issue to the purpose, policy, and scope
of the legislation.3 State law will readily be adopted unless the matter is so intimately connected with a general federal program that
congressional intent would be subverted by an application of diverse
local rules. 4 When the policy of the statute does not provide the
court with any specific guidelines, a well-established state rule may
offer a convenient alternative to the difficult task of judicial legislation.5 However, when federal interest predominates6 or when the
• 232 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
1. 232 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Cal. 1964).

2. Compare Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (.!Id Cir.
1957) (following the rule set forth in Restatement of Torts), with Hilton, Inc. v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (following the distinction
between release and covenant not to sue). A case occasionally cited as setting forth the
"federal rule" is McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943), which followed the
intent-full compensation test. See text accompanying note 21 infra. However, this
case did not arise under a federal statute, and it is usually cited in connection with
general tort actions. It is either implicitly rejected or not mentioned in many antitrust cases. See cases cited note 9 infra.
3. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law"-Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797
(1957); Comment, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955); Note, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 465 (1941);
Note, 59 HAR.v. L. REv. 966 (1946).
4. This practice is followed under the Federal Tort Claims Act where the application of state law is clearly preferable to a separate "federal tort law." See, e.g.,
Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963); Matland v. United States, 285
F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1961).
5. For example, when the federal act fails to specify a statute of limitations, the
question is usually regarded as one of local law. This was the prevailing situation under
the antitrust laws prior to the enactment by Congress of a uniform statutory period.
See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Barnes
Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942); Note, 53
CoLUM. L. REv. 68 (1953); Note, 60 YALE L.J. 553 (1951). State law has also been utilized
to decide collateral issues arising under federal statutes such as the Bankruptcy Act
(Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940)) (effect of a deed); Ta.x
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purpose of a statute can be achieved only through a comprehensive
system of uniform national regulation, collateral issues are governed
by federal law.7 If the determination has been made that the area
is exclusively federal, it becomes the responsibility of the federal
courts to fashion a rule designed to effectuate the policy of the
statute, independent of existing state law.8
It is presently unsettled whether the effect of the release of a
joint tortfeasor in a private action brought under the federal antitrust laws is of sufficient federal concern to dictate the application
of federal rather than state law. Courts applying state law treat the
problem in substantially the same manner as that of any other release; they do not discuss choice of law alternatives, despite the
fact that the action is based upon a federal statute rather than a
common-law tort.9 Implicit in these decisions is the assumption
that the release issue is not encompassed within the comprehensive
scheme of antitrust regulation. Similarly, in those cases where the
effect of a release has been regarded as a matter of federal law, the
single fact that the cause of action arises from a federal statute has
been determinative, without further analysis of the relationship of
the collateral issue to the overall program.10 The approach of the
(Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938)) (determination of heirs according to state law, but
application of exemption in statute governed by federal law); Bank Act (Reno Nat'l
Bank v. Seaborn, 99 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1938)) (segregation of funds for a trust).
6. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme
8: Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (concurring opinion). Federal law may be
held controlling even in the absence of a specific statute. See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons,
360 U.S. 593 (1959); United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Royal Indem.
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Note, 53 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 991 (1953); Note,
59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946).
7. E.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal courts
required to fashion federal common law of arbitration based on policy of national
labor laws); Dice v. Akron, C. &: Y. Ry., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (validity of release in FELA
action held a matter of federal law). In O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d
539 (1st Cir. 1940), it was held that the defense of privilege for a defamatory telegraph
message was to be determined by federal common law since the Communications Act
indicated an intent by Congress to institute a comprehensive system of regulation
which required a uniform rule.
8. The federal act may thus preclude defenses which could be exerted under state
law. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (Sherman Act);
Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942) (Bankruptcy Act); D'Oench,
Duhme &: Co v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (Federal Reserve Act); Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190 (1940) (Bank Act).
9. Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1957)
(assumed state and federal law identical); Eagle Lion Films Inc. v. Loews Inc., 219 F.2d
196 (2d Cir. 1955) (contract stipulated that it was to be governed by state law); Duffy
Theatres v. Griffith Consol. Theatres, 208 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1953); Suckow Borax
Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950); Solar Elec. Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
10. E.g., Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). In Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1960), holding
(by analogy to FELA actions) that federal law did not require a tender back of
consideration in order to repudiate a release allegedly induced by fraud, the court
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Winchester court in concluding that federal law should control and
in selecting a governing rule from among the divergent state rules
represents the first real judicial attempt to correlate federal antitrust policy with the choice of law rules as they both relate to the
effect of the release of a joint tortfeasor.
The court in Winchester found the application of federal law
necessary to the enforcement of a uniform federal antitrust policy.
This conclusion seems valid because the application of state law
would cause a geographical disparity resulting from the wide diversity of local rules regarding the release of a joint tortfeasor. 11
This conclusion is also supported by other considerations. It is clear
that the application of state law would prolong antitrust litigation
with complex collateral issues due to the presently unsettled nature
of choice of law rules. 12 Further, the increasing emphasis on the law
of the forum in modern theories of conflict of laws13 would often
provide the opportunity for the litigant to engage in forum-shopping
if state law were to govern the effect of a release. Similar considerations prompted Congress to enact a uniform statute of limitations
for private antitrust litigation14 and led the United States Supreme
Court to adopt federal law as controlling the effect of a release of
a joint tortfeasor in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. 15 It is of course true that a determination that federal law
should govern will not in itself produce national uniformity, because the federal courts may adopt differing rules as the controlling
federal law.16 The application of federal law is, nevertheless, a necessary first step on the path to the desired uniformity that can probably
be obtained only at the national level.17
concluded that the area was "dominated by the sweep of federal statutes." Presumably
the effect on the remaining defendants of a valid release would also be a matter of
federal law, although this question was not decided and the court regarded federal
and state law as the same for the purpose of this case. Occasionally a court will adopt a
rule without specifying whether state or federal law is being applied. See, e.g., Lysfjord
v. Flintkote, 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 368
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
11. 232 F. Supp. 556, 561 (N.D. Cal. 1964). See notes 18-22 infra and accompanying
text.
12. See generally Ehrenzweig, Release of Concurrent Tortfeasors in the Conflict
of Laws-Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 46 VA. L. R.Ev. 712 (1960); Wade,
Joint Tortfeasors and the Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. R.Ev. 464 (1953); Note, 60
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 522 (1960); Note, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 38 (1962); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1034
(1960). See also Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Cm,n.r. ANTITRUST REP. 380-81 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Attorney General's Report] (regarding choice of law problems existing prior to enact•
ment of a statute of limitations for antitrust litigation).
13. E.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Griffin v. Mccoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1941). See generally CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963).
14. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958). See Attorney General's Report 380-85.
15. Dice v. Akron, C. &: Y. Ry., 342 U.S. 359 (1951); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1213
(1959).
16. See note 2 supra.
17. The Winchester court fully recognized the lack of uniformity among state
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The prevailing practice among federal courts, however, is the
application of state rather than federal law. The majority view
among the states follows the strict common-law rule that a general
release of one tortfeasor operates to release all others, unless the
instrument can be construed as a covenant not to sue. 18 Many states,
however, modify this rule by providing that an express reservation
of rights against the remaining defendants will prevent total discharge.19 Considerable criticism has been directed at the strict common-law rule,20 and a minority of states now adhere to the more
modem view that the effect of a release is a question of the intent
of the parties and of whether full compensation has been received.21
The Winchester court selected as the controlling federal rule
this modem view as it is incorporated in section 4 of the Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,22 which specifically provides that an express reservation is not required in order to preserve
the plaintiff's claim against nonsignatory defendants. 28
The court is to be commended for discarding, in its search for
a uniform rule for the antitrust laws, the older rules which can
and federal courts and attached to its opinion a Certificate of Probable Cause suggesting
an immediate appeal in order to "materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation •.••" 232 F. Supp. 556, 563 (N.D. Cal. 1964). One might predict that the
release issue in antitrust litigation will eventually follow the same path toward
uniformity as releases in FELA actions.
18. PROSSER, TORTS§ 46 (lid ed. 1964); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 410-13 (1960).
19. Id. at 413-15. This is also the position taken by the REsTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 885(1) (1939): "A valid release of one tortfeasor from liability for a harm, given by
the injured person, discharges all others liable for the same harm, unless the parties to
the release agree that the release shall not discharge the others and, if the release is
embodied in a document, unless such agreement appears in the document." However,
where the defendants can be classified as independent rather than joint tortfeasors, the
rule does not apply. E.g., Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Pa.
1957); Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944). Contra, Rushford v.
United States, 92 F. Supp. 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1950), afj'd, 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 931-35 (1951); HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 10.1 (1956);
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 18, § 46; Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement With
One Co-obligor Upon the Obligations of Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. I (1959); Prosser,
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
1213 (1959); NoTE, 12 VAND L. REv. 1414 (1959). Avoidance of the common-law rule by
the device of a covenant not to sue has also been recognized as an artificial legal technicality based more on semantics than substance. See, e.g., McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d
659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945);
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351,
146 A.2d 665 (1958).
21. Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 422-31 (1960). Some courts take the position that
receipt of full compensation is the controlling test. E.g., Bolton v. Ziegler, Ill F. Supp.
516 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Derby
v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556 (1962); Note, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1142 (1963).
22. 9 U.L.A. 242 (1957) [hereinafter cited as the Uniform Act).
23. "A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after
judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid
for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the
total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid." Ibid.
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provide a "giant trap for the unwary." 24 However, the selection of
the original version of the Uniform Act as the controlling federal
rule is questionable. 25 It would seem preferable tq adopt the 1955
revised version, 26 which eliminated a provision subjecting the released tortfeasor to liability for contribution and added a requirement that releases must be given in good faith. 27 These changes
were intended to encourage out-of-court settlements by providing
releases with finality while prohibiting collusive agreements.28
The trebling of damages in antitrust suits29 raises significant
problems with regard to the manner in which the out-of-court settlement should affect the continuing liability of the tortfeasor not released. First, it must be determined whether the plaintiff's claim
against the non-released tortfeasor is to be reduced by the pro-rata
share of the released tortfeasor3° or by the actual amount received
in settlement. Second, it must be determined whether the credit
is to be applied before or after the court trebles the plaintiff's damages. If the judgment is credited to the extent of the released tortfeasor's pro-rata share, it obviously makes no difference whether
the credit is applied before or after the damages are trebled. 31 However, this could result in a substantial decrease in the satisfaction a
claimant would otherwise receive if he accepts an amount from the
released tortfeasor below the amount of his pro-rata share, which
can be finally determined only by the judgment.82 The develop24. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Co., 232
F. Supp. 556, 561 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
25. Only eight states have enacted this version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors Act, and of these only three states have retained the act in anything
like its original form. See 9 U.L.A. 116•17 (Supp. 1964) (Commissioners' Note). No
other federal court has adopted the Uniform Act for antitrust cases.
26. Id. at 122.
27. It is interesting to note that California has enacted a variation of the 1955
Uniform Act (CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 877) and therefore, in terms only of the effect
given to a general release, the result in the Winchester case would have been the same
under state law. For a comparison of the California statute with the original Uniform
Act, see Comment, 9 HAs:rlNGs L.J. 180 (1958).
28. 9 U.L.A. 123 (Supp. 1964) (Commissioners' Note).
29. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
30. For example, if plaintiff releases one of two defendants for $10,000 and then
recovers $30,000 against the other, the released defendant's pro-rata share of $15,000 is
deducted from the verdict. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bmk Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67,
HO A.2d 24 (1954); Smootz v. Ienni, 37 N.J. Super. 529, Il7 A.2d 675 (L. 1955). Cf.
Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956). See generally Note, 35
N.C.L. R.Ev. 141 (1956); Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 533 (1958).
31. Taking the example of note 30, if the credit is applied before trebling, the
$30,000 judgment is reduced to $15,000 and then trebled to $45,000. If the credit is
applied after trebling, the trebled judgment of $90,000 is reduced to $45,000.
32. Taking the example of note 30 supra, plaintiff is entitled to $90,000, yet after
deduction of the released defendant's pro-rata share he would be allowed to recover half
this sum of $45,000 which, added to the $10,000 already received in settlement, makes
his total satisfaction only $55,000. See Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126
A.2d 730 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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ment of antitrust laws favorable to the plaintiff,33 more liberal requirements for proof of damages, 34 and the award of attorney's fees 35
suggest that a plaintiff would not often be willing to settle when the
cost to him of undervaluing the liability of the released tortfeasor
would be multiplied threefold under the pro-rata share technique.
If, on the other hand, the actual consideration received in settlement
is credited against the plaintiff's claim, it becomes quite important
whether this is done before or after the trebling of damages. If deducted before the trebling of damages, the claimant runs the same
risk of a substantial diminution in his total recovery that he encounters under the pro-rata share method. If, however, the credit
is applied after the trebling of damages, the entire burden of the
punitive damages may be cast upon the non-released tortfeasors. For
example, in Lysfjord v. Flintkote,36 plaintiff recovered twenty thousand dollars in settlement from the released parties and subsequently
recovered a fifty thousand dollar verdict against the remaining defendant. It was held that the twenty thousand dollar consideration
for the release should be deducted from the trebled damages of 150,000 dollars rather than from the actual damages on the ground that
the trebled verdict represented the full satisfaction to which plaintiff
was entitled. 37 Thus, the non-released defendant was held liable
for a substantial proportion of the actual damages as well as the
entire 100,000 dollars in punitive damages. Arguably, one defendant
should not be so heavily penalized due to outside agreements over
which he has no control.38 Of course, a continuing liability for contribution from the released tortfeasor could eliminate this inequity,
but if the release does not operate to dispose of the matter with
finality, there is no reason why a tortfeasor would not personally defend in an attempt to reduce the damages.
The 1955 revision of the Uniform Act adopts the view that the
consideration for the release is deducted from the final judgment and
33. E.g., simplification of proof of conspiracy, growth of offenses illegal per se, a
broadened concept of interstate commerce, and increased potential liability under the
Robinson-Patman Act. OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 1035 n.6 (2d ed. 1959).
34. See, e.g., Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio-Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Bordonaro Bros.
Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949); William Goldman
Theatres v. Loew, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945). See generally Clark, The Treble
Damage Bonanza-New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L.
REv. 363 (1954).
35. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U .S.C. § 15 (1958).
36. 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
37. This method was strongly approved on appeal, and was also discussed and followed in Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708, 714-16
(N.D. Cal. 1962).
38. The discrepancy between amounts paid by released and nonreleased defendants
has been justified as an inducement to settle. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 665
(D.C. Cir. 1943), for a general discussion of the alternative methods of awarding
damages where a joint tortfeasor is released.
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the released tortfeasor is discharged from all liability for contribution, so long as the release was made in good faith. 89 Since the punitive damage aspect of private antitrust suits has been recognized
as an effective means of promoting private enforcement of the antitrust laws,40 the 1955 revision seems consonant with sound antitrust
policy.41 The plaintiff can freely execute a release without fear of
discharging the nonsignatory tortfeasors or sacrificing a part of his
eventual satisfaction, and the nonliability of the released defendant
for contribution is a strong incentive for out-of-court settlement.
It is clear that the equitable application of the revised act depends upon the rigorous enforcement of its requirement of good
faith, which constitutes the only protection afforded non-released
defendants against collusion between the plaintiff and the released
defendant.42 This safeguard might be strengthened by placing the
burden of proof upon the plaintiff to establish that the release was
entered into in good faith once the nonsignatory defendants demonstrate a substantial disproportion between the pro-rata shares and
the consideration given for the release. Strict enforcement of the
good faith requirement of the revised 1955 Uniform Act will prevent
collusive agreements without subverting the general policy of promoting the private enforcement of the antitrust laws.

39. Uniform Act § 4, 9 U.L.A. 122 (Supp. 1964).
40. Lysfjord v. Flintkote, 246 F.2d !168 (9th Cir. 1957); Bal Theatre Corp. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
41. But see Attorney General's Report !179 recommending the vesting of discretion
in the trial judge to impose double or treble damages in order to penalize willful
violators without imposing the harsh penalty of multiple damages on innocent
offenders.
42. The dangers of a release of one tortfeasor for a nominal amount because of
business reasons were alleviated under the original Uniform Act by the objective
requirement of contribution. See generally the discussion of the reasons for changing to
the more subjective standard of good faith in the Commissioners' Note to the revised
Act, 9 U.L.A. 122-2!1 (Supp. 1964).

